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Abstract
We study the interrelation among the post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) and mo-
mentum short-term anomalies, and the reversal long-term anomaly. Some theories argue that
PEAD and momentum are a consequence of underreaction to new information on the market.
One theory in particular, suggests that this underreaction occurs because investors are unsure
about their interpretations of the impact of new information on the fundamental price, and
look for the market consensus interpretation for guidance. This learning process takes time,
and until it is complete, prices do not fully incorporate the new information. Furthermore, the
more diﬃcult it is to interpret the new information, the more prices underreact to the new
information arrival, and the longer it takes for them to fully incorporate this information. On
the other hand, there are investors that rely too much on past performance (known as “trend
chasers”). These investors, motivated by the short-term performance during the underreaction
period, push prices beyond their fundamentals, resulting in an overreaction whose correction
generates long-run reversal. And the more diﬃcult it is to interpret new information, the more
likely it is that trend chasers create overreaction, leading to stronger reversals in the future.
Therefore, uncertainty about the interpretation of new information can potentially link today’s
reversal to past momentum and PEAD. Our major goal is to test this hypothesis. For that,
we use a multifactor risk-based model and NYSE-AMEX stock prices for the period starting at
January 1975 to December 2010. Our main conclusion points for a statistical and economical
relation between past PEAD and reversal. The higher the returns of the PEAD zero-investment
portfolio two years ago, the higher the returns of the reversal zero-investment portfolio today.
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1 Introduction
Pricing anomalies have been a major topic in ﬁnance research. During the last decades, scholars
have analyzed and tried to understand events that have implications on how stock prices react to
information. Some of those events fall outside the market eﬃciency hypothesis, being viewed as
market anomalies. Thus, academia has looked for asset-pricing theories in order to get reasonable
explanations for those market anomalies. In fact, as Fama (1998) points out, the greater our
understanding about those events, the better our knowledge about the eﬃcient market paradigm.
Perhaps the most common studied market anomalies have been the post-earnings announce-
ment drift (PEAD), momentum and reversal. The PEAD phenomenon, also known as earnings
momentum, was ﬁrstly documented by Ball and Brown (1968) and more recently by Bernard and
Thomas (1989) and others. In simple terms, this anomaly consists in prices being slow to fully
reﬂect earnings information. This means that it is possible to earn abnormal returns by going
long on stocks with positive earnings surprises (measured by standardized unexpected earnings,
SUE) and short on stocks with negative earnings surprises. The short-term return continuations
theory, the momentum phenomenon, ﬁrstly identiﬁed by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), identiﬁes
that short-term past winners will continue to be winners for a period of up to one year and short-
term past losers will still be losers for the same length of period. Thus, an investor who bases his
investment strategy on buying winners and selling losers can get abnormal returns for a period of
up to one year. Lastly, the long-term return reversals theory, the reversal phenomenon, was ﬁrstly
documented by De Bondt and Thaler (1985). This anomaly consists in stocks which currently have
bad performance, outperforming, on the long-run (following three to ﬁve years), stocks which are
currently performing well. Hence, an investor can earn positive returns over the long-run by going
long on the current losers and shorting the current winners.
As Fama and French (2008) pointed out, anomalies has been viewed as such when an event study
is not explained by the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and
Black (1972). In order to understand what motivates those anomalies, scholars have been trying to
ﬁnd reasonable explanations, most of the times based on asset-pricing models that use the CAPM
model as the starting point. Some of the new risk factors have been variables that represent those
market anomalies. One of the most successful model has been the Fama-French model (Fama
and French, 1993) where they present two new risk factors: one related to the ﬁrm size and the
other related to ﬁrm book-to-market ratio. More recent studies have been Chan et al. (1996),
who investigated the explanatory power of past returns and past earnings surprises explanatory
power on future returns, Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) concluded that earnings momentum and
price momentum are related in a multifactor framework and Simlai (2011) who used PEAD based
zero-investment portfolios on a multifactor model to check its asymmetric role on short-term return
continuations and on long-term return reversals.
In this context, our major goal with this paper is to contribute for a better understanding
about the interrelationship among the three most important anomalies: PEAD, momentum and
reversal. Here, our stronger focus is to see if contemporaneous reversal can be related with past
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PEAD and/or past momentum. Driven by this idea, one could think that past ongoings (good
news or bad news), due to their diﬃcult interpretation, originated investment decisions which could
result in earnings momentum and/or price momentum, that is, underreaction hypothesis (Bernard
and Thomas 1990 and Jegadeesh and Titman 1993). This short-term returns continuation could
take the stock prices beyond their fair price which, after some time, investors realize that their
investments are beyond its fundamentals. If this sentiment becomes generalized, they change their
positions, which could create price reversals, consistent with the overreaction hypothesis from De
Bondt and Thaler (1985).
In terms of methodology, we followed closely Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) and Simlai (2011).
The main idea is to form 10 deciles portfolios and a zero-investment portfolio for each anomaly
(formed by the diﬀerence between the extreme decile portfolios). Then, we use the PEAD or mo-
mentum based zero-investment portfolios as a fourth risk factor to extend the multifactor framework
of Fama and French (1993). The biggest noverly of our paper is that we consider not only con-
temporaneous variables, but also lags for short-term phenomenons (PEAD and momentum) in the
multifactor regressions, in order to investigate if those two past anomalies have implications on fu-
ture reversals. For this portfolio formation, we use NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ ﬁrms monthly returns
with data on COMPUSTAT, for a period which starts at January 1975 and ends at December 2010.
Note that, almost all studies on this topic do not include NASDAQ ﬁrms because they are not
statistically relevant. It is our goal to see what happens if we add NASDAQ ﬁrms. Thus, in this
sense, we use two sets of ﬁrms: one with and the other without NASDAQ ﬁrms.
Our main ﬁndings are: (i) trends and values are not far from Chordia and Shivakumar (2006)
results and we were able to get the same conclusion that PEAD helps to risk-control future momen-
tum returns (working as a fourth risk factor) and, thus, it seems that PEAD has strong statistical
and economic implication on future momentum based portfolios returns. However, we do not con-
clude that this model is well speciﬁed to explain future momentum returns, since it does not pass
the Gibbons et al. (1989) test; (ii) reversal is related with past PEAD, more precisely events that
took place 1-2 years before price reversals, have impact on future reversals and, thus, past events
which generated short-term anomalies can have impact on future reversals; (iii) the inclusion of
NASDAQ ﬁrms creates stronger anomalies and can change some conclusions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses data sample and Section 3
discusses portfolio formation based on the three anomalies. Section 4 presents time-series regression
models, whose results are discussed on Section 5 and Section 6 concludes. At the end of this paper
we present an Appendix with technical details.
2 Data and Settings
2.1 Data
To study the interrelation among the three anomalies, we need to construct portfolios that reﬂect
those anomalies. To do so, we use the WRDS platform to get all NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ monthly
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ﬁrms returns from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database and quarterly ﬁrms
earnings from COMPUSTAT database, for the sample period of January 1975 to December 2010.1
In addition, since our asset pricing tests are partially based on Fama and French (1993) three-factor
model, we use Professor Kenneth French´s web site to get the market (MKT), size (SMB) and
book-to-market equity ratio (HML) risk factors, as well as the risk-free rate (one-month treasury
bill).2
2.2 Settings
In our paper, in order to mitigate some “microstructure-induced biases”, Asem (2009), we excluded
the penny stocks, once they can skew the normal stock behavior. Thus, we don´t consider a monthly
observation whenever a stock has a price smaller than $1.
Contrary to most papers about these subjects, we included the delisting returns. To do that we
followed the work of Beaver et al. (2007). In fact, they concluded that “tests of market efficiency are
sensitive to the inclusion of delisting returns”. In addition, they pointed out that “some researchers,
because of the lack of comprehension about CRSP data or design choices results in the inadvertent
exclusion of delisting firm returns, could compromise the estimates of portfolio returns”. Hence, if
care is not taken, we can miss important observations in our sample.
In the Appendix, we add more technical information regarding delisting returns as well as
missing data and merging databases.
3 Portfolio Formation
After data collection and its reﬁnements, we can construct our portfolios based on the three market
anomalies that are going to be studied on this paper. These anomalies are PEAD, momentum and
reversal. Since part of our regression analysis is based on Fama and French (1993) three-factor
model, we will need market, size and book-to-market risk factors as well. On this paper we are
going to present two sets of results based on two sets of ﬁrms: one from NYSE-AMEX and the
other from NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ, both with data on COMPUSTAT.
3.1 Post-Earnings Announcement Drift
The post-earnings announcement drift phenomenon, one of the most studied anomalies in the ﬁnance
discipline, is based on the price change (drift from fundamentals) due to earnings announcement
surprises. The main idea is to compute those earnings announcements surprises (basically a diﬀer-
ence on earnings between two diﬀerent periods) and construct portfolios based on the ranking of
the earnings announcement surprises. The positions can be held up to twelve months.
To perform the construction of our portfolios, we follow the work of Chordia and Shivakumar
(2006). After getting all earnings from all ﬁrms, we compute the respective standardized unexpected
1We exclude ADRs, REITs, Americus Trust Components, units, and closed-end funds from all our analyses.
2http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
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earnings, SUE. This is done via a scalled seasonal random walk model without drift, which is
a diﬀerence between the most recent earnings and its counterpart four quarters ago, using the
standard deviation of this diﬀerence over the prior eight quarters to rescale the random walk. So,
for each month t and ﬁrm i the SUE is given by
SUEit =
Eiq − Eiq−4
σiq
, (3.1)
where Eiq is the most recently announced earnings of ﬁrm i on a given quarter q, Eiq−4 is the
earnings announced four quarters prior to the most recent one and σiq is the standard deviation of
(Eiq − Eiq−4) over the previous eight quarters. Therefore, computing SUE requires a minimum of
eight straight earnings announcement. In cases where we face up to three quarters in a row with
missing earnings, we assume SUE = 0, that is, the most recent earnings announcement is equal to
the one announced four quarters ago. As Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) pointed out, in order to
avoid using stale earnings, we only consider as the most recent earnings those that were released no
earlier than four months before the end of the formation month.
After SUE computations, for each month, ﬁrms are sorted into 10 decile equally-weighted
portfolios based on their SUE ranking.3 These portfolio positions are held for 6 months, that is
we consider a buy-and-hold strategy, starting at month t and ending at month t + 5. Therefore,
every month only 1/6 of the investment positions are renewed, which avoids test statistics based
on overlapping returns, as noticed by Chordia and Shivakumar (2006). The ﬁrst decile portfolio,
denoted Low, corresponds to those ﬁrms with lowest SUE, whereas the tenth decile portfolio, denoted
High, corresponds to those ﬁrms with highest SUE. The zero-investment portfolio is formed by going
long on High and short on Low and it is denoted by PMN (Positive Minus Negative).
3.2 Momentum
This anomaly, largely documented throughout the 90’s, is related to past returns. The basic idea
is to, every month, rank stocks based on their past short-run (up to twelve months) returns and
form portfolios according to this ranking, with positions also held for a short-period (up to twelve
months).
Similarly to earnings momentum, for short-run return continuations phenomenon, we follow the
Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) methodology. Thus, we form 10 equally-weighted deciles portfolios
which are based on ﬁrms compounded returns ranking. This ranking is constructed in the following
way: for each month t we compute the compounded 6-month return of all ﬁrms with returns between
t−6 and t−1. After this, we sort all ﬁrms into 10 deciles portfolios where the investment is held for
6 months, from month t to month t+5, computing buy-and-hold returns (again the same approach
that avoids test statistics based on overlapping returns). Similarly, the ﬁrst decile portfolio contains
ﬁrms with the lowest compounded returns from the formation period, the Low decile portfolio, and
the tenth decile portfolio contains ﬁrms with the highest compounded returns from the formation
3For this ranking, we do not consider the SUE = 0 assumption.
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period, the High decile portfolio. The diﬀerence between those extreme decile portfolios, that is,
long position on High and short position on Low, forms the zero-investment portfolio denoted by
WMLm (Winners Minus Losers).
3.3 Reversal
Perhaps the most controversial anomaly has been price contrarian. The long-run return reversal,
basically, consists of buying ﬁrms that have performed badly in the past 5 years (60 months), and
selling ﬁrms that have performed well in the same period.
For the reversal anomaly we consider the work of De Bondt and Thaler (1985); Fama and
French (1996); Lakonishok et al. (1994). Each year we rank ﬁrms into decile portfolios based on
their compounded returns between t−60 and t−13.4 For each ﬁrm, we require a return observation
per month throughout the formation period. Using this sorting, we form 10 equally-weighted deciles
portfolios. Each position is held for 60 months, from month t to month t+59. Whenever a delisting
occurs, positions are held until the delisting-month. Similar to momentum, the ﬁrst decile portfolio
receives ﬁrms with the lowest compounded returns from the formation period, and is denoted by Low,
the tenth decile portfolio receives ﬁrms with the highest compounded returns from the formation
period, and is denoted by High. In order to get the zero-investment portfolio, we go long on High
and short on Low.5 This zero-investment portfolio is denoted by WMLr (Winners Minus Losers).
4 Regression Model Specifications
During the 60’s, a new asset pricing paradigm arised in ﬁnance, the well-known CAPM model.6
Basically, the CAPM tells us that the expected return of security i is a linear function of the risk-free
rate and a risk premium that compensates for the exposure of security i to market risk,
E(Rit) = Rf + βit[E(Rmt)−Rf ], (4.1)
where E(Rit) is the expected return of security i at time t, Rf is the risk-free rate, E(Rmt) is
the expected return for the market portfolio at time t and βit security i’s time t non-diversiﬁable
risk factor loading on the market risk.
Some scholars have pointed out that CAPM is insuﬃcient to explain some market anomalies.
Moreover, Fama and French in their remarkable series of papers, Fama and French (1992, 1993),
came out with two new explanatory factors, one related to ﬁrms market size and the other related
to ﬁrms book-to-market ratio. They argue that their model can predict future returns and explain
some of CAPM-related anomalies, Fama and French (1996). According to Fama and French three-
factor model, the expected return of security i is given by:
4For reversal t represents January. That is, the ranking and investment decision is made in January of every year.
5Note that, on the behalf of reversal theory, the way we form the zero-investment portfolio must result in negative
returns.
6Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Black (1972) work.
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E(Rit) = Rf + βit[E(Rmt)−Rf ] + sitE(SMBt) + hitE(HMLt), (4.2)
where sit is the factor loading related to size risk (SMB) for security i at time t and hit is the
factor loading related to book-to-market ratio risk (HML).
Using this framework, like Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) and Simlai (2011), we extend the
Fama-French three-factor model with the PEAD and momentum zero-investment portfolios. That
is, each zero-investment portfolio will work as a fourth risk factor. In this way, we can check if these
two anomalies, represented by those portfolios, have explanatory power on future portfolio returns
based on PEAD, momentum or reversal theories. Thus, as dependent variables we use portfolios
based on the three anomalies. Notice that each group of portfolios is formed by 10 decile portfolios
and a zero-investment portfolio, for each anomaly. As independent variables, beyond market, size
and book-to-market risk factors, we have PEAD and momentum zero-investment portfolios as a
fourth independent variable, which are represented by PMN and WMLm, respectively. Therefore,
we will run two sets of regressions:
Set 1
Rit −Rf = ai + βi[Rmt −Rf ] + si(SMBt) + hi(HMLt) + pi(PMNt) + εit, (4.3)
Rit −Rf = ai + βi[Rmt −Rf ] + si(SMBt) + hi(HMLt) + wi(WML
m
t ) + εit, (4.4)
where Rit − Rf represents momentum and PEAD portfolios excess return to one-month t-bill
rate on equations 4.3 and 4.4, respectively, pi is the factor loading of PEAD, wi is the factor loading
of momentum, i represents each decile portfolio (out of 10) and the zero-investment portfolio, t
represents monthly time and εit is the error term.
Set 2
Rit −Rf = ai + βi[Rmt −Rf ] + si(SMBt) + hi(HMLt) + pi(PMNt) + εit, (4.5)
Rit −Rf = ai + βi[Rmt −Rf ] + si(SMBt) + hi(HMLt) + wi(WML
m
t ) + εit, (4.6)
where Rit−Rf represents reversal portfolios excess return to one-month t-bill rate on equations
4.5 and 4.6. Again, i represents each decile portfolio and the zero-investment portfolio.
Thus, on set 1 we have the framework of Chordia and Shivakumar (2006), where they study the
interrelation between PEAD and momentum.7 On set 2 we have, partially, the Simlai (2011) frame-
work, where he analyzese whether contemporaneous PEAD-based portfolio returns or momentum-
based portfolio returns have an implication on reversal-based portfolio returns.
As a third set, we present two regression models that show our major goal with this paper. Apart
from our Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) and Simlai (2011) replications, we want to test whether
reversal has some linear relation to PEAD or momentum. The diﬀerent point here, when compared
to set 2, is that we want to relate reversal to past PEAD and momentum portfolio returns, that is,
7The regression model equation 4.4 is also known as the Carhart (1997) four-factor model.
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we use lags for these two variables. In fact, this idea comes from behavioral theories that short-run
continuation (PEAD and momentum) originate from an underreaction to information and its slow
incorporation into prices, Bernard and Thomas (1990) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), and long-
run reversal comes from an overreaction to the way investors form their expectations: “investors
give too much weight to the past performance of firms and too little to the fact that performance
tends to mean-revert”, as Fama (1998) puts about De Bondt and Thaler (1985) conclusions. Our
point is to see if overreaction can be a result from past underreaction.
As we mentioned above, short-run continuation is a result of underreaction to information and
its slow incorporation into prices that can lasts up to one year. We believe that as the information
is more diﬃcult to interpret (more uncertainty), the incorporation of information into prices will be
more diﬃcult and thus slower, creating larger and stronger post-earnings announcement drift and
momentum, as the theoretical model of Barbosa (2011) predicts. If we assume that some investors
are “trend chasers” as in the model of Hong and Stein (1999) (known as “momentum traders”, that
is, technical traders who rely their investment strategies on past performance), we expect to see that
as investors are more uncertain about the interpretation of information, the greater the tendency of
prices overshooting beyond their fundamentals. When investors realize that those prices are beyond
the fair prices, prices will tend to revert, creating price reversals, as concluded by Hong and Stein
(1999) (see Figure 4.1 and 4.2 for a theoretical example). Thus, to make a point, the greater the
uncertainty and the diﬃculty to interpret the information, the more pronounced the subsequent
underreaction, which results in a more pronounced overreaction later on. The former implies a
stronger PEAD and momentum, whereas the latter implies a stronger correction that generates a
stronger reversal. Thus, larger PEAD and momentum should be related to larger reversals, but
not contemporaneously. Instead, this relationship should be lagged in time (see Figure 4.3 for a
theoretical example). In addition to these theoretical work, Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) found
that, over the 1965 to 1998 sample period, cumulative momentum proﬁt increases until 12.17% at
the end of month 12 and from month 13 to month 60 the momentum proﬁts are on average negative
(that is, price reversals). By the end of month 60 the cumulative momentum proﬁt declines to -
0.44%. Hence, assuming these ideas and this empirical results, we expect to see a negative correlation
between past underreaction and future overreaction.8
In this sense, since we are computing reversal on ﬁve years basis, we want to add lags up to
ﬁve years to the three factor model. Because we are working on monthly basis, assuming 60 lags
will diminish statistical test’s power. Therefore, we compute annual non-overlapping compounded
portfolio returns for PEAD and momentum monthly zero-investment portfolios. Thus, for each
month t, we assume that the ﬁrst annualized return (the contemporaneous annual return) aggregates
monthly returns from t− 11 to t, the second aggregates from t− 23 to t− 12, and so on, until the
fourth which aggregates monthly returns from t− 59 to t− 48. Thereby, we present the third and
last set of regressions,
8Note that we expect negative correlation because reversal portfolios are constructed to have negative returns.
Otherwise we would expect positive correlation.
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Figure 4.1: Theoretical example of a price behavior. This ﬁgure plots a perfect reaction to a
new market information at time zero. The price moves upwards from 1 to 1.5, that is, there is an
instantaneous change on price because all investors had the same interpretation of the information,
leading to a perfect incorporation of that information into prices.
Figure 4.2: Theoretical example of a price behavior. This ﬁgure plots an uncertainty/weak
interpretation of a new market information at time zero. The price moves upwards from 1 to
1.3 instantaneously, but far from its fundamental price. Then, there are an underreaction to the
fair price, going slowly until 1.5. Because of the lack of understanding of this information and
motivated by these shy increase, some investors known as “trend chasers”, push the price beyond
its fundamental, causing an overshooting on price, until it reaches the value of 1.7, at month 18.
During the month 19 and the month 60, there are a constant decreasing on price (overreaction)
until it reaches its fundamental of 1.5.
9
Figure 4.3: Theoretical example of a price behavior. This ﬁgure plots an uncertainty/weak
interpretation of a new market information at time zero. This ﬁgure plots an uncertainty/weak
interpretation of a new market information at time zero. The price moves upwards from 1 to
1.1 instantaneously, but far from its fundamental price. Then, there are an underreaction to the
fair price, going slowly until 1.5. Because of the lack of understanding of this information and
motivated by these shy increase, some investors known as “trend chasers”, push the price beyond
its fundamental, causing an overshooting on price, until it reaches the value of 2, at month 18.
During the month 19 and the month 60, there are a constant decreasing on price (overreaction)
until it reaches its fundamental of 1.5. The idea with this ﬁgure, comparing to Figure 4.2, is
that when investors have more diﬁculty to interpret information, that causes more pronounced
underreaction and, consequently, more pronounced overreaction.
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Set 3
Rit −Rf = ai + βi[Rmt −Rf ] + si(SMBt) + hi(HMLt) +
4∑
k=0
pik(PMNk) + εit, (4.7)
Rit −Rf = ai + βi[Rmt −Rf ] + si(SMBt) + hi(HMLt) +
4∑
k=0
wik(WML
m
k ) + εit, (4.8)
whereRit−Rf represents reversal portfolios excess return to one-month t-bill rate for both equations,
pik represents the factor loading of annual PMNk returns and wik represents the factor loading of
annual WMLmk returns and k represents each annual lag of annualized PEAD zero-investment
portfolio in equation 4.7 and momentum zero-investment portfolio in equation 4.8. Note that k
starts at zero and goes up to four, and each lag represents the annual compounded return for
PEAD and momentum monthly portfolios for a certain group of past returns.
In statistical terms, we have to test the following:


H0 : pi0 = . . . = pi4 = 0
Ha : ∃pik 6= 0.


H0 : wi0 = . . . = wi4 = 0
Ha : ∃wik 6= 0.
,
and in order to see results which hold our hypothesis, at leat one pik must be diﬀerent from
zero.
Additionally, for all regressions, we implement the Newey and West (1987) coeﬃcient standard
errors correction, that is, corrected for homoscedasticity and autocorrelation issues.
5 Empirical Results
We are going to present results for two sets of ﬁrms: one for ﬁrms listed on the NYSE-AMEX
exchanges, the other for ﬁrms listed on the NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ exchanges. First we are going
to show some summary statistics in order to have an idea about the variables behavior and to make
sure that the PEAD, momentum and reversal anomalies are present in our sample. Second, we
present the results for the regression models speciﬁed on Section 4.
5.1 Summary Statistics
Starting with Table 1, panel A and B show the mean, t-stastistic, percentage of portfolios with
positive return and Pearson correlation coeﬃcients for the ﬁve variables studied on this paper,
through the period starting in January of 1975 and ending in December of 2010. The market
risk premium averaged a monthly 0.62% during this time frame, and this ﬁgure is statistically
signiﬁcant, as we can see on panel A. The Fama-French variables, size eﬀect risk factor (SMB) and
book-to-market risk factor (HML), present positive average monthly returns, 0.32% and 0.38%,
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respectively, being in both cases statistically signiﬁcant as well. The PEAD risk factor (PMN )
has an outstanding average return of 1.15% per month, which compared to the ﬁgure presented by
Simlai (2011) of 0.87% and by Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) of 0.90%, means that the PEAD
phenomenon is stronger in our sample. Moreover, this value is statistically signiﬁcant. For the
remaining two variables we can observe a positive mean (0.61%) for returns from zero-investment
momentum portfolios (WMLm) but a negative average monthly return (-0.40%) for zero-investment
reversal portfolios (WMLr), as we could expect on the behalf of reversal theory, being in both cases
statistically signiﬁcant. These ﬁgures are not far from those obtained by Chordia and Shivakumar
(2006) and Simlai (2011), since the former presents a 0.76% for momentum and the latter a -0.48%
for reversal. In addition, for all 5 zero-investment portfolios, we can conclude that more than 50%
of those portfolios have positive monthly return (except for reversal portfolios, as expected). Due
to these results, we can conclude that those anomalies are present in our sample.
Still in Table1, panel B suggests that there is no multicollinearity problems among the vari-
ables, since Pearson correlation coeﬃcients are relatively low. Nevertheless, the correlation between
momentum based zero-investment portfolio and PEAD based zero-investment portfolio should be
highlighted, since there is strong evidence that those anomalies are strongly correlated, which is
consistent with the results of Chordia and Shivakumar (2006), that PEAD and momentum are
related in a multifactor relation. In contrast to Simlai (2011), the correlation between reversal and
PEAD and momentum is weak, suggesting a weak relation between contemporaneous underreaction
and overreaction.
Table 2 shows the same statistics as Table 1 but now with NASDAQ ﬁrms included in the
sample. Note that, although all the means are statistically relevant and the Pearson correlation
is not changing too much, the PEAD, momentum and reversal zero-investment portfolios present
mean return larger than those obtained when NASDAQ ﬁrms are excluded. This conclusion can
be explained by the fact that NASDAQ index contains many ﬁrms that have small capitalization.
This fact is extremely important because, as ? concludes, “the profitability of momentum strategies
declines sharply with market capitalization“. Thus, when we add more small ﬁrms, we may expect
a performance increase on portfolios based on those anomalies.
In Table 3, which reports results for the NYSE-AMEX ﬁrms sample, we have some additional
features about the 10 decile portfolios for each anomaly that we are studying. Panel A shows
us clear evidence that portfolios formed by ﬁrms with the lowest SUE generate a lower average
monthly return, for the period between January 1975 and December 2010, than portfolios formed
by ﬁrms with the highest SUE. In fact, starting at the Low portfolio, which presents an average
monthly return of 0.75%, we can see a monotonic increase in monthly returns as we move toward
the High portfolio, which presents an average monthly return of 1.90%. This result is consistent
with Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) and Simlai (2011), which present an increasing trend as well.
Panels B and C present the 10 decile portfolios formed on the basis of momentum and reversal
theories, respectively. Starting with the momentum portfolios, portfolios formed by ﬁrms that
performed badly in the past, Low portfolio, present an average monthly return of 0.98%. On the
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other hand, portfolios formed by ﬁrms that performed well in the past, High portfolio, have a high
value of 1.59%. Hence, we can observe an increase on average monthly portfolio return throughout
the 10 decile momentum portfolios (from the lowest decile up to the highest decile). Although
the gap between those extreme decile portfolios on Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) and Simlai
(2011) are bigger, our results for momentum portfolios seem to be consistent. The reversal anomaly
presents an opposite trend for the 10 decile portfolios when compared to the 10 decile momentum
portfolios. In fact, for reversal portfolios we can report an average for the monthly return of the
Low portfolio of 1.49% and 1.09% for High portfolio, which means that the ﬁrst decile portfolio gets
a higher return than the tenth decile portfolio. Even though the variance between those extreme
decile portfolios is not so high as those from PEAD or momentum, we still can ﬁnd a decreasing
trend on the average monthly return’s value from the Low portfolio to the High portfolio (which
seems to be consistent with Simlai (2011) results).
Table 4 is basically a replication of Table 3 but adding NASDAQ ﬁrms. As in Table 3, PEAD
and momentum decile portfolios present a positive trend in their average monthly returns, and
reversal portfolios present a negative trend from decile 1 to decile 10. Note again that, although
those tables present similar results, when we add NASDAQ ﬁrms we obtain larger gaps between
extreme deciles. Thus, as we concluded from the comparison between Table 1 and Table 2, NASDAQ
can increase the strength of PEAD, momentum and reversal anomalies.
5.2 Post-Earnings Announcement Drift and Momentum
5.2.1 Momentum vs Post-Earnings Announcement Drift
On this subsection we present regression analysis for the interrelation between PEAD and momen-
tum phenomenons. The idea is to replicate the work of Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) and Simlai
(2011). As we mentioned on Section 4, we show the results for the Fama-French model (equation
4.2) and its extension by including the PEAD zero-investment portfolio (equation 4.3). Thus, we
start with Table 5 where the period under study starts at January 1975 and ends at December
2010, and where the NYSE-AMEX ﬁrms set are being used. On panel A we have the results for
the regression from equation 4.2. Here, the dependent variables are the 10 decile portfolios and the
zero-investment portfolio WMLm, formed on the basis of momentum theory, and the independent
variables are the well known market, SMB and HML portfolio returns. Comparing to Chordia and
Shivakumar (2006), the results have some similarity. The trend in the regression intercepts is simi-
lar, starting at -0.63% for the Low portfolio and increasing monotonically until 0.25% for the High
portfolio. The value obtained for the intercept of WMLm suggests that the zero-investment port-
folio that exploits the momentum anomaly generates abnormal returns.9Furthermore, the Gibbons
et al. (1989) test shows that the Fama-French three factor model is not well speciﬁed to capture
the behavior of portfolios returns based on momentum strategy.
On panel B we have the four-factor model (equation 4.3) which is, basically, the extension of the
9Note that the intercept from W MLm is 0.43%, while the difference between the extreme deciles gives a value of
0.88%. This happens because we are working with excess returns, thus, we expect those values to be different.
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Fama-French three factor model with the PMN risk factor. As in Chordia and Shivakumar (2006),
the trend on intercept coeﬃcients changes, now it starts at 0.68% for the decile one and monotoni-
cally decreases until -0.38% for the decile ten, when momentum are being risk-controlled for PEAD
risk factor. In fact, the WMLm portfolio’s intercept is -1.49%, which shows that controlling for the
PMN risk factor the WMLm portfolio has a negative abnormal return. Similarly to Chordia and
Shivakumar (2006), the earnings-based zero-investment portfolio (PMN ) is statistically signiﬁcant
for most of the decile portfolios, whose loadings increase from -0.99% for the ﬁrst decile portfolio to
0.50% for the tenth decile portfolio. Highlighting the zero-investment portfolio (WMLm), only the
PMN factor has a high signiﬁcance level of 8.89 for the t-statistic. Moreover, when we use a three-
factor model we get a very low 4.77% for the adj.R2, but adding the PMN factor, we get a higher
adj.R2 of 55.17%. Regarding the Gibbons et al. (1989) test, we cannot conclude the same as Chor-
dia and Shivakumar (2006). In fact, in our case this test indicates that the four-factor model with
PMN as the fourth risk factor is not well speciﬁed to explain momentum based portfolio returns.
Nevertheless, this four-factor model has a higher explanatory power on momentum portfolios when
compared to the Fama-French three-factor model. These diﬀerences could be related to the fact
that our sample is diﬀerent from Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) and/or our sample speciﬁcations
are diﬀerent as well (for example, we are using the delisting returns approach outlined by Beaver
et al. 2007). This indicates that the ﬁndings of Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) are not very robust
(their conclusions are valid only at 1% signiﬁcance level).
On Table 6 we have the results for the regression model of equation 4.2 on panel A and for the
regression model of equation 4.3 on panel B, but now using the NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ ﬁrms set.
As we can see, all the trends and even the values are quite similar to Table 5 (without NASDAQ
ﬁrms). However, notice that although the Gibbons et al. (1989) statistic concludes that none of the
models is well speciﬁed to explain momentum returns, on panel A (where we are using the Fama-
French model) 7 out of 10 intercept coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant, but on panel B (where
the Fama-French model gets a fourth risk factor - PMN ) only 4 out of 10 intercept coeﬃcients
are statistically signiﬁcant. That is, the inclusion of PEAD risk factor seems to help control the
variation on future returns based on momentum strategies. Even though these models are not well
speciﬁed, there is a clear evidence that PEAD strongly helps to predict future momentum portfolio
returns.
5.2.2 Post-Earnings Announcement Drift vs Momentum
Like Chordia and Shivakumar (2006), we also want look at the linear relation between momentum
as the dependent variable and PEAD as the independent variable, as in the regression model of
equation 4.4. Similarly, we show results where we use the Fama-French three-factor model and a
four-factor model known as Carhart (1997) model. The results for the former are shown on panel A
from Table 7. The intercept coeﬃcient increases monotonically from -0.70% for the Low portfolio to
0.64% for the High portfolio, whereas the intercept when the zero-investment portfolio PMN is used
as dependent variable is a highly statistically signiﬁcant 0.89%. The results for the latter appears on
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panel B from the same table and, even after controlling for momentum eﬀect, we have a signiﬁcant
positive abnormal return for the PMN portfolio of 0.56%. We can also conclude that Carhart
(1997) model is not well speciﬁed to explain PEAD based portfolios, as Chordia and Shivakumar
(2006) pointed out, since the Gibbons et al. (1989) statistic says that this model is not well speciﬁed
to explain future PEAD portfolio returns. Additionally, we can observe an increase on adj.R2 from
9.96% to 57%, when we add the momentum factor as explanatory variable.
On Table 8 we have the results for the same regressions as on Table 7 but with NASDAQ
ﬁrms. The values and trends are similar. Comparing to the conclusion from Table 5 and Table
6, momentum based zero-investment portfolio does not control the risk variation of PEAD based
portfolio returns. Even though when we add WMLm as a fourth risk factor the explanatory power
increases, the speciﬁcation of the model is not so strong as when PMN works as a fourth risk
controller for momentum based portfolios, as we can conclude from Gibbons et al. (1989) statistic.
5.3 Reversal vs Post-Earnings Announcement Drift and Momentum
5.3.1 Contemporaneous variables
On Table 9 we present the results for the third set of regression models. For these regressions we are
using the NYSE-AMEX set of ﬁrms, throughout the period starting at January 1975 and ending at
December 2010. On this table we have three panels: on panel A we present results for the Fama-
French factor model, on panel B we extend the momentum zero-investment portfolio (WMLm) as a
risk factor and on panel C we have the PEAD zero-investment portfolio (PMN ) working as a fourth
risk factor.
Starting with panel A, the three risk factors from Fama-French model present loadings sta-
tistically signiﬁcant for all of 10 decile portfolios and for the zero-investment portfolio (WMLr),
in terms of independent test (t-test), which shows the strength of the model. In terms of the
speciﬁcity of the model, the conclusion seems to be the same as in Fama and French (1996), once
all 10 decile reversal based portfolios have intercepts equal to zero, based on the Gibbons et al.
(1989) statistic test where we don´t reject the null at 1% signiﬁcance level. Hence, one can re-
assure that the three-factor model from Fama and French (1993, 1992) model is well speciﬁed to
explain reversal phenomenon. This conclusion cannot be extended to the zero-investment portfolio
(WMLr) because the intercept coeﬃcient is not statistically diﬀerent from zero. On panel B, where
we have WMLm as the fourth risk factor, we can see that the momentum zero-investment portfolio
has implication on reversal based portfolios, since all momentum factor loadings are statistically
signiﬁcant. In addition, the Gibbons et al. (1989) statistic shows that this model is well speciﬁed
to explain reversal returns. However, the t-test value for the intercepts are smaller for the Fama-
French model than the model given by equation 4.6 and the increase on the adj-R2 is almost null.
Beyond that, there is no statistical relation with the reversal zero-investment portfolio, once the
WMLm does not have explanatory power on WMLr. Thus, it does not seem to bring much to
explain future reversal returns. Finally, panel C presents the results for the regression model where
the three-factor model is augmented by the PEAD risk factor, that is, the PMN variable. We can
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easily see that there is no suggestion that PEAD has some linear relation with reversal anomaly,
once almost all factor loadings for PEAD are statistially insigniﬁcant at 5% level (note that these
results are similar to the ones from Simlai 2011).
Lastly on this subsection, we would like to notice that when we add NASDAQ ﬁrms, the results
for the regression model are diﬀerent. In fact, as we can see on Table 10, panel A shows that
the p-value of Gibbons et al. (1989) test statistic is zero, which means that the Fama-French three
factor model is not well speciﬁed to explain future reversal returns. Thus, one could argue about the
strong predictability of future reversal returns by the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model
as it was shown on Fama and French (1996).
Concluding, although one could argue about some linear relation between contemporaneous
momentum and reversal, the results don’t show a clear-cut conclusion about that. In fact, the three
Fama-French factors have explanatory power on the reversal zero-investment portfolio, but the
PEAD and momentum portfolios do not. Hence, the inclusion of contemporaneous underreaction
(PEAD and momentum) does not bring much to risk-control reversal returns.
5.3.2 Non-contemporaneous variables
On section 4 we present a set of regression models where the major idea is to see if past underreaction
(PEAD and momentum) have impact on future overreaction (reversal). Thus, on Table 11 we
have results for the models of set 3, where the dependent variable is the reversal based portfolios,
divided into 10 deciles portfolios and a zero-investment portfolio, which is the diﬀerence between
the extreme portfolios (High minus Low), and the independent variables are the Fama-French three-
factor model augmented by PEAD returns portfolio and momentum returns portfolio, PMN and
WMLm, respectively. In this case, instead of having only contemporaneous monthly returns, we
have lags for the annualized returns. As we explained on section 4, we want to see what happens if
we add 60-month of lags but, once that would be too much to put in a regression model, we prefer
to use annualized returns which, turns out, we only have 5 lags to include. Hereupon, on panel A we
have the results for equation 4.7, that is, the factor loadings and the t-statistic for each coeﬃcient.
As one can see, although market, size and book-to-market factor loadings are statistically signiﬁcant
all over the 10 decile portfolios, the lags on PMN are not. But, on reversal zero-investment portfolio
(WMLr), one can ﬁnd that the Fama-French risk factors are statistically signiﬁcant and there is
one PMN lag that is statistically signiﬁcant, PMN(-1). That is, the ﬁrst lag for annualized PMN,
which holds monthly PMN returns from t − 23 to t − 12, has impact on reversal returns with a
magnitude of -0.03. Further, note that the value of the loading is negative, which implies that this
lag has a negative impact on reversal. This is exactly what we expected regarding the relation
between past underreaction (which is what we have here) and future overreaction, where the larger
the past underreaction, the larger the reversal (note that, as we already mentioned, the way we
construct reversal portfolios we expect a negative value for this loading). Moreover, the intercept is
not signiﬁcant, that is, it is statistically equal to zero, hence, the model is well speciﬁed.10 In this
10We get the same results when we only put the first lag for the annualized PMN on the regression model.
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sense, we have an important ﬁnding that the variation on reversal based zero-investment portfolio
returns can be expressed by the variation on the three-factor risk factor model from Fama and
French (1993, 1992) and the lag 1 from PEAD based zero-investment portfolio annualized returns.
Finally, concerning the 10 decile portfolios, the Gibbons et al. (1989) statistic shows that this model
is well speciﬁed, but this result could be biased by the fact that we are adding too many variables.
Panel B gives us the results for equation 4.8, where lags for momentum based portfolio returns are
being added. There are some lags that are statistically signiﬁcant for some decile portfolios but
there are no consistency throughout them. In the case of the zero-investment portfolio (WMLr)
there are no momentum lag that has statistical relevance. Therefore, the momentum anomaly past
observations do not have impact on future reversal.
The last table (Table 12), shows the results for the models of set 3, but adding NASDAQ
ﬁrms. The conclusion about the impact of annualized PEAD based zero-investment portfolio returns
remains. As one can see, the ﬁrst lag of PMN annualized returns, PMN(-1), has a signiﬁcantly
negative (as we predicted) impact of -0.03 on reversal based zero-investment portfolio (WMLr).
Although the intercept coeﬃcient is statistically equal to zero, when we regress only with the Fama-
French three-factor plus the ﬁrst lag of the annualized PMN, the intercept is no longer statistically
equal to zero, which makes this model not well speciﬁed. Thus, when we add NASDAQ ﬁrms these
model is not enough to explain future reversal returns. Panel B shows the results for the equation
4.8, where some lags from momentum based zero-investment portfolio annualized returns are added
to Fama-French three-factor model. Like annualized PMN, annualized WMLm does not have
impact on any of the 10 decile portfolios (at 5% level of signiﬁcance) but, on the WMLr portfolio,
the fourth lag, that is, accumulated monthly momentum returns from zero-investment portfolios
starting at t − 59 to t − 48 (WMLm(-4)), has a small negative but statistically signiﬁcant impact
of -0.01. Looking at the intercept t-test we can conclude that its value is statistically signiﬁcant,
that is, diﬀerent from zero, and, therefore, the expected return for this portfolio doesn’t belong to
the minimum variance boundary when risk controlled by this model. Hence, this model is not well
speciﬁed to explain reversal returns.
In short, these results, although not surprisingly robust, point in the direction of our initial
hypothesis: there is evidence that past underreaction can have an impact/be one explanatory
variable for future overreaction. More precisely, we found evidence that past observations of PEAD
based portfolio returns, namely the ones that took place between t − 23 to t − 12, have statistical
implication on future reversal portfolio returns. Beyond that, the model given by the equation
4.7 showed to be suﬃcient to explain future zero-investment portfolios based on reversal theory,
that is, the WMLr portfolio. Hereupon, this investigation based on risk-based models tries to
help the behavioral ﬁnance understanding about these anomalies, that they are a deviation from
fundamentals due to the lack of comprehension/understanding of the information, which can cause
an ineﬃcient incorporation of that information into prices. At a certain point in time, this lack
of comprehension can create short-term anomalies (PEAD and momentum) and the greater the
diﬃculty to incorporate the information into prices, the greater the overshooting on them during
17
the medium-term, creating price reversals in the long-term when investors adjust the price to its
fundamentals. Hence, it does not only make sense to think about a theoretical economic relation
between past underreaction and future overreaction, but can also be an empirical observation.
6 Conclusion
In the last thirty years, we have seen an increase on the willing to ﬁnd explanations for some anoma-
lies that are not suﬃciently captured by the widely used CAPM model. In fact, even after some
relevant studies that have explained the behavior and interrelationships among these anomalies,
they still persist nowadays. This paper appears with the purpose of helping on a deeper under-
standing and knowledge about these anomalies per se and the relation among them. Our paper
shows that for the period from January 1975 to December 2010 we still observe post-earnings an-
nouncement drift, price momentum and price reversal phenomenons. In addition, the replication
of the results from Fama and French (1996) and Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) give us similar
conclusions. We have the same conclusion as Fama and French (1996) that the three factor Fama-
French model is well speciﬁed to explain reversal (at decile portfolios level, this conclusion is not
valid to the zero-investment portfolio). Although our results do not conclude that the Fama-French
model augmented by the PEAD is not well speciﬁed to explain momentum returns as Chordia
and Shivakumar (2006) did, we still conclude that those variables are strongly related and there is
strong evidence that PEAD returns have stronger explanatory power to explain momentum returns
than the opposite. We should add to this that our sample and its reﬁnements (delisting returns,
merging data issues, etc.) can be part of the explanations for those diﬀerences. Nevertheless, it
seems that the same work-base is being used. The new part comes from some of the behavioral
theories about these anomalies. They point that there is a relation between underreaction (PEAD
and momentum) and overreaction (reversal). In simple terms, there are investors that create un-
derreaction at the short-term, some of them, known as “trend chasers”, creates an overshooting on
prices, leading them to possible price reversals at long-term. Thus, our major purpose with this
paper is, using a risk-based model, to see if there exist a statistical relation between past underre-
action and future overreaction (non-contemporaneous relation). The main ﬁnding on this work is
that past post-earnings announcement drift based portfolio returns (the zero-investment portfolio
PMN ) successfully explains future reversal based portfolio returns (the zero-investment portfolio
WMLr).
For a ﬁnal remark, we would like to mention some points about the inclusion of NASDAQ ﬁrms.
As we mentioned, we worked with two sets of ﬁrms: NYSE-AMEX and NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ.
The technological NASDAQ index is mostly formed by small ﬁrms. As we highlighted, the size
eﬀect creates stronger PEAD, momentum and reversal. As we saw, this can be proved once our
portfolios formed on the basis of those anomalies showed stronger results when we worked with
NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ. Other important point is our conclusions about the regression models
with variables formed when NASDAQ ﬁrms are added. First, the Chordia and Shivakumar (2006)
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replication work seems to present the same ﬁgures, that is, we can still conclude a strong relation
between PEAD and momentum but we still conclude that this model is not enough to risk-control
each other. Second, the ﬁndings made by Fama and French (1996), where the three factor model
successfully explains reversal returns, are not subsumed with NASDAQ ﬁrms, once the model is no
more well speciﬁed to explain future reversal returns. Third and last, our ﬁndings about the relation
between past underreaction and future overreaction, partially still persist. There is a relevant value
for the second lag of annualized PMN loading, but the intercept is statistically diﬀerent from zero
when only this lag is added to the Fama-French model. Additionally, the momentum theory seems
to have some implication, once the lag 4 of annualized WMLm is statistically relevant, but the
intercept loading is statistically relevant, that is, not diﬀerent from zero. Thus, NASDAQ ﬁrms can
have an important impact, changing the strength of PEAD, momentum and reversal anomalies and
some conclusions about models when only NYSE-AMEX ﬁrms are being used.
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Appendix
Missing Data
Sometimes, stocks have no closing price for last trading day. Hence we cannot compute returns for
that month. In this case, CRSP allows us to use two possible proxy approaches. One of them is the
average for bid-ask prices at the last trading day. That is, we assume that the average of bid and
ask prices are the price of the last trading day and, in this way, we can compute a monthly return.
The other solution is the alternative prices. Even though the price for last trading day of the
month is missing, we can use the last month-day with price - last non-missing price.
Merging Databases
One set of portfolios, based on one of the anomalies, needs earnings data to be computed: the
PEAD anomaly. Thus, we need to relate CRSP returns and COMPUSTAT earnings. To do so,
we have to merge both databases. Hence, we used the CUSIP11 method to match the PERMNO12
and GVKEY13. Due to this matching, we may face some issues. The ﬁrst one is related to ﬁscal
year changes. We need to delete repeated earnings announcements and, taking into account the
earnings quarter, ﬁscal earnings quarter and date of EPS (Earnings Per Share) reporting, get as
many consecutive earnings as possible. The second one is related to M&A duplications. In order to
solve this, we look for duplications at price, date of EPS reporting and EPS level. When we have
PERMNO with more than one GVKEY, we choose the one that has price continuation on CRSP.
Delisting Returns
In simple terms, a delisting return is a return that comes from the comparison between the security´s
value after being delisted, that is, when a stock is removed from a stock exchange, and its price on
the last trading day (before being delisted). The most common reasons for a delisting are mergers
and acquisitions and poor performance. We should add delisting returns to our portfolios because,
as Beaver et al. (2007) puts, “the omission of delisting returns is likely to affect estimates of portfolio
returns because the expected return conditional on the reason for delisting is not generally zero.”, and
it adds that “if the market return measure does not include delisting returns, market and market-
adjusted returns will be affected.”. There are three big reasons for a careless exclusion of delisting
returns: “First, requiring future earnings excludes two-thirds of delisting firm-years. Second, nearly
half of all delistings occur outside the date range provided by the CRSP/Compustat merged database,
so valid delisting firm-years are excluded if one does not include matches outside the CRSP-specified
date range. Third, when using monthly delisting returns, researchers unfamiliar with the details of
CRSP data who use replacement values for firms with missing delisting returns will not identify all
missing delisting returns because monthly delisting returns generally contain a partial month return
11Common identifier between those databases.
12Main identifier from CRSP.
13Main identifier from COMPUSTAT.
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even when the delisting return is missing. Treating partial month returns as valid delisting returns
implicitly assumes a delisting return of zero, which can affect estimated portfolio returns.”, Beaver
et al. (2007). Although, at the simple case, the way to treat delisting returns is straightforward
(just compute an arithmetic return), we may face some challenges regarding the time of delisting,
missing delisting returns or the way CRSP records these delists14.
14See Beaver et al. (2007) to know more on this.
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Table 1: Mean, t-stat, Pearson correlation coefficients of risk factors and percentage
of positive monthly returns. Those risk factors are: Market risk, Rm − Rf , that is, monthly
market index excess return of one-month t-bill; Size risk, SMB, which stands for Small Minus Big
and it is monthly return of a portfolio based on ﬁrms market size; Book-to-market ratio, HML,
which means High Minus Low and this portfolio is contructed on the basis of book-to-market ratio;
Post-Earnings Announcement drift (PEAD) risk factor, denoted by PMN which means Positive
Minus Negative and this zero-investment portfolio is formed on the basis of earnings surprises,
which is oftenly used the SUE (Standardized Unexpected Earnings) measure: for each month t,
SUE = (Eiq − Eiq−4)/σiq, where Eiq is the most recent earnings announcement (no longer than
four months) for ﬁrm i on quarter q, and σiq is the standard deviation of (Eiq −Eiq−4) for the prior
eight quarters. After this, ﬁrms are sorted into 10 decile portfolios and the PEAD risk factor is
the diﬀerence of the tenth decile portfolio (also known as High) and the ﬁrst decile portfolio (also
known as Low), where the investment is held for 6-months; Momentum risk factor, portfolio known
as Winners Minus Losers (WMLm), which is a zero-investment portfolio where long positions
come from the portfolio with the highest past six-months return and short positions come from the
portfolios with the lowest past 6-months return, and positions are held for 6-months; Reversal risk
factor, portfolio known as Winners Minus Losers (WMLr), which is a zero-investment portfolio
where long positions come from the portfolio with the lowest past 60-months return and short
positions come from the portfolio with the highest past 60-months return, and positions are held
for 60-months. January 1975 to December 2010. NYSE-AMEX ﬁrms.
Panel A: Mean, t-stat and %>0
Rm −Rf SMB HML PMN WML
m WMLr
Mean(%) 0.62 0.32 0.38 1.15 0.61 -0.40
t-stat 2.80 2.13 2.54 8.60 2.44 -3.19
%>0 59.95 53.24 56.25 77.89 65.02 44.09
Panel B: Correlations
Rm −Rf SMB HML PMN WML
m WMLr
Rm −Rf 1.00
SMB 0.23 1.00
HML -0.34 -0.32 1.00
PMN -0.18 -0.19 -0.13 1.00
WMLm -0.18 -0.08 -0.10 0.76 1.00
WMLr 0.16 -0.31 -0.30 0.13 0.13 1.00
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Table 2: Mean, t-stat, Pearson correlation coefficients of risk factors and percentage of
positive monthly returns. January 1975 to December 2010. NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ ﬁrms.
Panel A: Mean, t-stat and %>0
Rm −Rf SMB HML PMN WML
m WMLr
Mean(%) 0.62 0.32 0.38 1.35 0.69 -0.59
t-stat 2.79 2.13 2.54 11.73 2.57 -4.95
%>0 59.95 53.24 56.25 82.41 65.96 39.25
Panel B: Correlation
Rm −Rf SMB HML PMN WML
m WMLr
Rm −Rf 1.00
SMB 0.23 1.00
HML -0.34 -0.32 1.00
PMN -0.11 -0.26 -0.03 1.00
WMLm -0.12 0.02 -0.08 0.63 1.00
WMLr 0.20 -0.34 -0.23 0.15 -0.01 1.00
Table 3: Summary statistics (mean, t-test and percentage of positive monthly returns) for
monthly portfolio returns based on PEAD, Momentum and Reversal. For each anomaly are formed
10 decile portfolios based on a certain ranking. PEAD is based on SUE ranking, Momentum is
based on the short-run cumulative returns ranking and Reversal is based on the long-run cumulative
returns ranking. January 1975 to December 2010. NYSE-AMEX ﬁrms.
Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High
Panel A: PEAD portfolios
Mean(%) 0.75 0.95 1.06 1.20 1.31 1.50 1.64 1.75 1.73 1.90
t-stat 2.51 3.47 3.92 4.41 4.83 5.67 6.25 6.79 6.62 7.36
%>0 59.30 61.06 61.81 62.81 66.08 66.08 68.34 67.09 65.33 67.34
Panel B: Momentum portfolios
Mean(%) 0.98 1.16 1.29 1.32 1.34 1.37 1.35 1.37 1.44 1.59
t-stat 2.67 4.05 4.99 5.52 5.80 6.05 5.91 5.80 5.72 5.44
%>0 55.63 59.15 61.97 64.08 65.26 65.73 66.43 66.67 65.73 65.73
Panel C: Reversal portfolios
Mean(%) 1.49 1.39 1.36 1.27 1.29 1.27 1.24 1.22 1.15 1.09
t-stat 4.80 5.10 5.31 5.26 5.36 5.38 5.21 4.86 4.34 3.65
%>0 61.29 65.32 66.67 66.67 65.86 67.74 66.13 65.32 64.52 59.68
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Table 4: Summary statistics (mean, t-test and percentage of positive monthly returns) for
monthly portfolio returns based on PEAD, Momentum and Reversal (10 decile portfolios). January
1975 to December 2010. NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ ﬁrms.
Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High
Panel A: PEAD portfolios
Mean(%) 0.71 0.87 1.01 1.20 1.36 1.58 1.72 1.85 1.91 2.06
t-stat 2.38 3.12 3.58 4.21 4.86 5.86 6.36 6.82 7.00 7.69
%>0 57.54 58.54 60.05 61.81 65.08 65.33 66.58 66.08 66.33 69.10
Panel B: Momentum portfolios
Mean(%) 1.07 1.06 1.17 1.28 1.29 1.38 1.40 1.49 1.56 1.75
t-stat 2.70 3.45 4.43 5.36 5.73 6.24 6.27 6.28 5.88 5.28
%>0 58.45 60.09 61.74 65.02 65.26 66.43 67.37 66.67 65.96 64.32
Panel C: Reversal portfolios
Mean(%) 1.73 1.55 1.47 1.35 1.34 1.32 1.28 1.25 1.16 1.14
t-stat 5.48 5.72 5.80 5.68 5.87 5.64 5.49 5.16 4.50 3.71
%>0 64.78 65.86 66.40 66.13 67.20 66.94 66.94 67.20 64.52 60.75
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Table 5: Results from time series regressions. Panel A gives results for equation 4.2 regression model, where Momentum decile
portfolios and the zero-investment portfolio WMLm work as dependent, and the three Fama-French variables are the independent; panel
B gives results for equation 4.3 regression model, where Momentum decile portfolios and the zero-investment portfolio are being risk
controlled by a four-factor model, that is, the Fama-French model augmented by PMN. The Gibbons et al. (1989) test statistic and the
associated p-values are also being presented. January 1975 to December 2010. NYSE-AMEX ﬁrms.
Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High W MLm
Panel A: Momentum portfolios–three-factor model
MKT 1.28 1.10 1.04 0.99 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.97 1.00 1.07 -0.21
SMB 0.85 0.60 0.49 0.43 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.42 0.50 0.74 -0.10
HML 0.61 0.58 0.55 0.51 0.48 0.45 0.42 0.41 0.36 0.28 -0.33
INTERCEPT -0.63 -0.27 -0.07 0.02 0.07 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.17 0.25 0.43
t (MKT) 15.42 21.74 28.12 34.61 37.24 32.09 27.13 26.38 21.65 23.17 -1.86
t (SMB) 5.26 5.07 4.67 4.54 4.80 4.81 4.62 4.85 5.90 9.27 -0.83
t (HML) 4.02 6.08 6.92 7.05 6.90 6.26 5.43 5.11 4.09 3.14 -1.73
t (INTERCEPT) -3.45 -2.25 -0.65 0.23 0.89 1.51 1.28 1.45 1.89 2.48 2.02
F-test 392.30 692.59 936.91 1219.19 1450.99 1485.38 1398.02 1280.96 1080.53 898.83 8.09
Prob (F-test) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adj − R2(%) 73.42 83.00 86.85 89.58 91.10 91.29 90.79 90.03 88.40 86.37 4.77
GRS test statistic 3.60
GRS (p-value) 0.00
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Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High W MLm
Panel B: Momentum portfolios–four-factor model with PMN
MKT 1.18 1.05 1.01 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.96 1.00 1.04 1.12 -0.06
SMB 0.64 0.49 0.42 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.45 0.55 0.81 0.17
HML 0.35 0.44 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.38 0.02
PMN -0.99 -0.51 -0.30 -0.14 -0.05 0.06 0.16 0.27 0.40 0.50 1.47
INTERCEPT 0.68 0.40 0.32 0.21 0.15 0.05 -0.10 -0.22 -0.35 -0.38 -1.49
t (MKT) 19.21 25.45 28.83 30.68 32.79 30.88 29.41 34.02 35.55 38.73 -1.02
t (SMB) 3.70 3.92 3.81 3.99 4.44 4.79 4.96 5.62 7.45 11.70 1.21
t (HML) 2.56 4.69 5.37 5.75 5.97 6.01 5.92 6.54 6.72 5.86 0.14
t (PMN ) -6.63 -5.11 -3.91 -2.54 -1.15 1.58 4.78 9.54 11.50 10.87 8.89
t (INTERCEPT) 2.12 1.87 1.82 1.45 1.17 0.46 -0.94 -2.32 -3.85 -3.01 -4.10
F-test 493.77 673.24 749.47 862.18 982.25 1008.77 1020.47 1072.62 1109.86 940.03 123.13
Prob (F-test) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adj − R2(%) 83.24 87.14 88.29 89.67 90.81 91.03 91.13 91.52 91.78 90.44 55.17
GRS test statistic 5.50
GRS (p-value) 0.00
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Table 6: Results from time series regressions. Panels A and B give the results for Momentum portfolios using Fama-French model
equation 4.2 and the four-factor model equation 4.3. The Gibbons et al. (1989) test statistic and the associated p-values are also being
presented. January 1975 to December 2010. NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ ﬁrms.
Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High W MLm
Panel A: Momentum portfolios–three-factor model
MKT 1.19 1.04 0.96 0.91 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.88 0.92 1.02 -0.17
SMB 1.04 0.81 0.68 0.61 0.57 0.56 0.60 0.68 0.82 1.10 0.06
HML 0.15 0.23 0.30 0.33 0.35 0.34 0.30 0.24 0.13 -0.10 -0.24
INTERCEPT -0.38 -0.27 -0.11 0.04 0.07 0.17 0.20 0.28 0.33 0.47 0.41
t (MKT ) 14.70 22.98 30.94 40.68 42.67 38.91 33.52 33.58 33.95 35.04 -1.69
t (SMB) 6.41 6.65 6.61 7.22 7.19 7.89 10.07 16.37 26.93 19.89 0.30
t (HML) 0.79 1.95 3.50 5.07 6.02 6.36 6.05 5.30 2.39 -1.26 -0.98
t (INTERCEPT) -2.15 -2.32 -1.18 0.48 1.03 2.56 3.04 4.60 4.81 4.26 1.85
F-test 331.61 588.14 895.51 1369.70 1729.07 2086.43 2341.01 2572.90 2166.48 1439.81 3.99
Prob(F-test) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Adj− R2(%) 70.00 80.56 86.33 90.62 92.42 93.64 94.29 94.78 93.86 91.04 2.07
GRS test statistic 6.18
GRS (p-value) 0.00
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Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High W MLm
Panel B: Momentum portfolios–four-factor model with PMN
MKT 1.15 1.02 0.95 0.90 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.89 0.92 1.02 -0.13
SMB 0.76 0.65 0.57 0.54 0.53 0.54 0.60 0.70 0.86 1.14 0.39
HML -0.03 0.12 0.23 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.25 0.14 -0.08 -0.05
PMN -1.33 -0.76 -0.46 -0.25 -0.10 0.00 0.09 0.18 0.24 0.29 1.61
INTERCEPT 1.51 0.79 0.52 0.37 0.20 0.16 0.07 0.02 -0.00 0.08 -1.87
t (MKT ) 19.31 26.50 30.87 35.91 36.53 36.60 34.93 40.48 46.20 41.60 -1.81
t (SMB) 4.17 4.82 5.20 6.21 6.73 7.84 10.54 18.14 28.49 19.21 1.74
t (HML) -0.21 1.07 2.60 4.14 5.28 6.07 6.45 6.73 3.15 -1.08 -0.22
t (PMN ) -5.50 -4.63 -4.09 -3.38 -1.87 0.08 2.17 5.07 5.03 3.65 5.37
t (INTERCEPT) 3.35 2.64 2.44 2.42 1.62 1.49 0.73 0.33 -0.02 0.42 -3.33
F-test 458.13 661.13 834.03 1080.61 1203.53 1427.08 1646.13 1994.22 1746.11 1110.89 72.75
Prob(F-test) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adj− R2(%) 82.16 86.93 89.35 91.58 92.38 93.49 94.31 95.26 94.62 91.79 41.96
GRS test statistic 6.83
GRS (p-value) 0.00
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Table 7: Results from time series regressions. Panel A gives results for equation 4.2 regression model, where PEAD decile portfolios
and the zero-investment portfolio PMN work as dependent and the three Fama-French variables are the independent. Panel B gives
results for equation 4.4 regression model (Carhart (1997) model), where Momentum decile portfolios and the zero-investment portfolio
are being risk controlled by a four-factor model, that is, the Fama-French model augmented by WMLm. The Gibbons et al. (1989) test
statistic and the associated p-values are also being presented. January 1975 to December 2010. NYSE-AMEX ﬁrms.
Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High P MN
Panel A: SUE portfolios–three-factor model
MKT 1.13 1.07 1.04 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.03 1.01 1.03 1.02 -0.11
SMB 0.58 0.52 0.53 0.58 0.58 0.48 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.40 -0.17
HML 0.62 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.46 0.41 0.43 0.38 -0.24
INTERCEPT -0.70 -0.41 -0.30 -0.17 -0.08 0.16 0.32 0.46 0.43 0.64 0.89
t (MKT) 21.19 27.18 34.58 34.65 40.97 36.04 31.58 36.14 36.18 29.30 -1.76
t (SMB) 6.34 5.49 5.45 5.87 7.38 4.73 4.63 4.99 4.71 3.63 -2.91
t (HML) 6.45 6.54 7.02 7.23 8.15 6.73 6.23 5.55 5.60 4.51 -2.24
t (INTERCEPT) -6.44 -4.66 -3.35 -1.70 -0.84 1.65 3.41 4.81 4.84 6.34 7.99
F-test 727.42 1032.77 1121.14 1285.32 1329.92 1226.30 1146.44 1118.41 1103.72 937.06 15.65
Prob(F-test) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adj − R2(%) 84.59 88.63 89.43 90.66 90.94 90.25 89.64 89.41 89.29 87.61 9.96
GRS test statistic 14.59
GRS (p-value) 0.00
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Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High P MN
Panel B: SUE portfolios–four-factor Carhart model
MKT 1.05 1.02 1.00 1.02 1.03 1.03 1.02 1.00 1.02 1.02 -0.03
SMB 0.54 0.49 0.52 0.56 0.57 0.47 0.45 0.47 0.46 0.40 -0.14
HML 0.51 0.43 0.44 0.46 0.53 0.47 0.44 0.41 0.42 0.39 -0.12
W ML
m -0.33 -0.21 -0.17 -0.13 -0.09 -0.09 -0.07 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.35
INTERCEPT -0.39 -0.21 -0.14 -0.04 0.01 0.24 0.38 0.48 0.45 0.61 0.56
t (MKT) 43.32 37.40 39.49 33.71 37.77 37.20 31.77 35.98 35.58 31.56 -0.86
t (SMB) 8.58 6.40 6.04 6.26 7.78 4.85 4.71 4.92 4.66 3.52 -2.02
t (HML) 9.26 7.61 7.64 7.37 7.28 6.56 5.94 5.42 5.62 4.77 -1.84
t (W MLm) -8.74 -6.08 -6.04 -5.75 -2.86 -2.71 -1.79 -0.49 -0.59 1.04 14.42
t (INTERCEPT) -4.15 -2.48 -1.57 -0.42 0.10 2.44 3.63 4.71 4.74 5.80 4.96
Adj − R2(%) 92.71 92.44 92.11 92.27 91.70 90.93 90.04 89.41 89.29 87.67 57.00
F-test 1263.47 1213.91 1158.95 1184.90 1097.66 996.17 898.39 838.54 828.15 706.93 132.58
Prob(F-test) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GRS test statistic 16.56
GRS (p-value) 0.00
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Table 8: Results from time series regressions. Panels A and B give the results for PEAD portfolios using Fama-French model
equation 4.2 and the Carhart (1997) model equation 4.4. The Gibbons et al. (1989) test statistic and the associated p-values are also
being presented. January 1975 to December 2010. NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ ﬁrms.
Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High P MN
Panel A: SUE portfolios–three-factor model
MKT 1.03 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 1.00 -0.04
SMB 0.78 0.69 0.74 0.77 0.75 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.58 -0.19
HML 0.33 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.22 0.21 0.21 -0.12
INTERCEPT -0.64 -0.42 -0.30 -0.11 0.04 0.29 0.43 0.59 0.65 0.82 1.01
t (MKT) 28.17 35.17 45.32 40.91 43.22 49.58 42.52 50.27 46.37 39.41 -0.79
t (SMB) 13.00 10.35 13.14 10.00 10.52 10.43 8.77 11.56 10.04 7.70 -3.86
t (HML) 4.74 4.78 5.27 4.77 6.23 6.30 5.73 4.77 4.28 4.06 -1.57
t (INTERCEPT) -7.07 -5.53 -4.20 -1.45 0.57 4.02 5.82 7.81 8.67 9.87 9.84
F-test 884.87 1234.94 1358.21 1322.45 1653.33 2009.36 1834.32 2153.32 1817.42 1643.09 10.54
Prob(F-test) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adj − R2(%) 86.98 90.31 91.12 90.90 92.58 93.82 93.27 94.21 93.21 92.54 6.73
GRS test statistic 26.18
GRS (p-value) 0.00
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Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High P MN
Panel B: SUE portfolios–four-factor Carhart model
MKT 0.98 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.01
SMB 0.80 0.71 0.75 0.78 0.76 0.69 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.58 -0.21
HML 0.26 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.20 0.20 0.20 -0.06
W ML
m -0.29 -0.23 -0.20 -0.21 -0.16 -0.11 -0.11 -0.08 -0.07 -0.04 0.25
INTERCEPT -0.37 -0.21 -0.11 0.08 0.19 0.39 0.53 0.66 0.72 0.86 0.78
t (MKT) 46.68 43.39 47.49 40.55 39.71 47.67 42.94 46.02 43.69 40.58 0.37
t (SMB) 28.95 23.69 26.20 17.40 17.15 14.86 11.77 14.78 12.47 8.64 -2.69
t (HML) 7.75 7.65 7.99 6.71 6.83 6.39 6.05 4.45 4.54 4.30 -1.04
t (W MLm) -13.55 -8.31 -6.46 -6.61 -9.48 -5.89 -5.54 -4.43 -3.04 -1.59 8.35
t (INTERCEPT) -4.13 -2.62 -1.37 0.94 2.53 5.53 7.24 8.48 8.74 9.91 6.98
F-test 1714.43 2184.42 1939.51 1872.08 1970.71 1945.12 1697.29 1818.83 1492.38 1261.33 75.54
Prob(F-test) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adj − R2(%) 94.52 95.65 95.13 94.96 95.20 95.14 94.47 94.82 93.76 92.70 42.89
GRS test statistic 27.29
GRS (p-value) 0.00
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Table 9: Results from time series regressions. Panel A shows results for equation 4.2 regression model which is the same as
Fama-French model, where Reversal based 10-decile and a zero-investment (WMLr) portfolios are the dependent variables; panels B
and C show the results for equations 4.6 and 4.5, respectively, where the former is a Fama-French model plus a fourth factor that is the
Momentum risk factor and the latter is a Fama-French model plus a fourth factor that is the PEAD risk factor, and the dependent is the
Reversal based 10-decile and a zero-investment portfolio (WMLr). The Gibbons et al. (1989) test statistic and the associated p-values
are also being presented. January 1975 to December 2010. NYSE-AMEX ﬁrms.
Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High W MLr
Panel A: Reversal portfolios–three-factor model
MKT 1.08 1.02 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 1.01 1.05 1.15 0.07
SMB 0.78 0.59 0.44 0.37 0.32 0.26 0.22 0.26 0.32 0.41 -0.35
HML 0.59 0.55 0.58 0.53 0.53 0.48 0.43 0.42 0.37 0.28 -0.31
INTERCEPT 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.02 -0.06 -0.16 -0.70
t (MKT) 31.11 35.42 38.05 40.26 40.70 38.62 40.32 40.49 43.08 41.99 2.68
t (SMB) 6.34 6.03 4.93 4.47 3.77 3.15 2.70 3.00 3.55 4.37 -6.18
t (HML) 6.98 8.60 9.09 8.73 8.27 7.28 6.46 5.93 5.27 3.67 -5.80
t (INTERCEPT) 0.81 0.84 0.97 0.53 0.89 0.99 0.74 0.21 -0.69 -1.68 -6.34
F-test 739.28 1140.98 1204.87 1248.01 1195.30 1145.78 1074.52 1028.57 1128.62 1118.61 49.25
Prob(F-test) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adj − R2(%) 85.65 90.21 90.68 90.98 90.62 90.25 89.67 89.26 90.12 90.04 28.07
GRS test statistic 1.98
GRS (p-value) 0.035
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Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High W MLr
Panel B: Reversal portfolios–four-factor model with Momentum
MKT 1.03 0.98 0.97 0.93 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.99 1.02 1.11 0.08
SMB 0.75 0.57 0.42 0.36 0.31 0.25 0.22 0.25 0.30 0.39 -0.35
HML 0.52 0.50 0.54 0.51 0.51 0.46 0.41 0.40 0.33 0.23 -0.30
W ML
m -0.19 -0.13 -0.11 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.10 -0.15 0.03
INTERCEPT 0.29 0.21 0.19 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.03 -0.01 -0.73
t (MKT) 28.88 34.06 41.70 43.46 43.01 39.62 40.78 41.88 49.31 52.18 2.75
t (SMB) 7.10 6.58 5.27 4.63 3.81 3.16 2.67 3.03 3.70 4.78 -6.38
t (HML) 7.21 8.99 9.45 8.33 8.11 6.86 6.13 5.54 4.91 3.15 -5.59
t (W MLm) -5.87 -5.60 -3.97 -3.11 -2.54 -2.24 -2.08 -2.43 -3.33 -5.72 0.85
t (INTERCEPT) 2.35 2.29 2.35 1.59 1.84 1.81 1.35 0.97 0.36 -0.15 -6.40
F-test 702.63 1048.48 1061.53 1025.00 950.35 911.40 835.45 821.94 945.70 1061.64 37.49
Prob(F-test) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adj − R2(%) 88.32 91.87 91.96 91.69 91.10 90.75 90.00 89.85 91.06 91.96 28.24
GRS test statistic 1.69
GRS (p-value) 0.082
Panel C: Reversal portfolios–four-factor model with PEAD portfolios
MKT 1.06 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.96 1.00 1.04 1.13 0.07
SMB 0.74 0.57 0.43 0.36 0.31 0.26 0.22 0.25 0.30 0.38 -0.35
HML 0.55 0.52 0.56 0.52 0.53 0.47 0.43 0.41 0.34 0.24 -0.31
PMN -0.18 -0.10 -0.08 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.10 -0.17 -0.00
INTERCEPT 0.35 0.22 0.19 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.06 -0.70
t (MKT) 26.46 30.82 38.27 38.34 39.06 36.91 37.81 38.11 41.97 43.26 2.45
t (SMB) 6.06 5.85 4.74 4.37 3.75 3.11 2.72 2.93 3.38 3.99 -6.34
t (HML) 6.09 7.72 8.59 8.01 7.82 6.70 6.02 5.30 4.59 2.91 -5.28
t (PMN) -2.46 -1.79 -1.27 -1.00 -0.46 -0.43 -0.28 -0.96 -1.70 -2.83 -0.05
t (INTERCEPT) 1.82 1.47 1.42 0.91 0.97 0.95 0.75 0.73 0.55 0.47 -5.19
F-test 580.57 877.11 919.00 939.65 895.02 858.57 804.08 775.71 867.26 891.50 36.84
Prob(F-test) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adj − R2(%) 86.20 90.43 90.82 91.01 90.60 90.24 89.65 89.31 90.33 90.57 27.87
GRS test statistic 1.013
GRS (p-value) 0.43
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Table 10: Results from time series regressions. Panels A, B and C give the results for Reversal portfolios using Fama-French model
and four-factor model (with Momentum or PEAD as a fourth risk factor). The Gibbons et al. (1989) test statistic and the associated
p-values are also being presented. January 1975 to December 2010. NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ ﬁrms.
Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High W MLr
Panel A: Reversal portfolios–three-factor model
MKT 0.99 0.94 0.92 0.89 0.88 0.90 0.90 0.93 0.98 1.09 0.11
SMB 0.98 0.75 0.65 0.54 0.47 0.44 0.41 0.43 0.48 0.62 -0.35
HML 0.33 0.39 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.39 0.34 0.29 0.10 -0.24
INTERCEPT 0.46 0.32 0.26 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.10 -0.01 -0.05 -0.95
t (MKT) 38.43 43.40 51.62 47.36 42.27 39.70 42.21 44.69 46.89 44.01 3.66
t (SMB) 12.46 10.24 10.11 8.81 6.78 5.75 5.39 5.85 5.98 7.12 -6.00
t (HML) 4.83 7.74 9.71 10.06 8.94 8.25 6.84 6.18 5.04 1.63 -3.75
t (INTERCEPT) 3.97 3.88 4.07 2.62 2.74 1.99 1.61 1.18 -0.12 -0.63 -8.87
F-test 892.88 1430.85 1881.53 1985.17 1737.26 1660.41 1404.70 1477.46 1623.04 1638.03 48.05
Prob(F-test) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adj − R2(%) 87.82 92.04 93.83 94.13 93.35 93.06 91.90 92.27 92.92 92.98 27.56
GRS test statistic 5.54
GRS (p-value) 0.00
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Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High W MLr
Panel B: Reversal portfolios–four-factor model with Momentum
MKT 0.95 0.91 0.90 0.87 0.87 0.89 0.89 0.91 0.96 1.05 0.10
SMB 0.98 0.76 0.65 0.55 0.47 0.44 0.41 0.44 0.48 0.63 -0.35
HML 0.29 0.36 0.39 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.37 0.32 0.27 0.05 -0.24
W ML
m -0.18 -0.14 -0.11 -0.08 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.08 -0.10 -0.18 -0.01
INTERCEPT 0.64 0.45 0.37 0.24 0.25 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.09 0.12 -0.94
t (MKT) 31.47 36.31 49.05 46.90 44.50 43.54 45.65 47.39 51.18 70.10 3.53
t (SMB) 18.12 15.49 15.45 12.04 8.37 7.08 6.47 7.44 7.96 12.18 -6.01
t (HML) 5.19 8.45 11.74 10.39 9.05 8.31 6.66 5.96 4.57 1.05 -3.65
t (W MLm) -5.73 -6.24 -6.65 -4.52 -2.61 -2.81 -2.30 -3.22 -3.84 -9.29 -0.13
t (INTERCEPT) 5.56 5.80 5.89 4.18 4.14 3.34 2.65 2.40 1.22 1.77 -8.01
F-test 896.50 1512.14 1978.58 1824.95 1454.03 1409.32 1146.42 1269.05 1495.33 2189.56 35.97
Prob(F-test) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adj − R2(%) 90.61 94.22 95.52 95.16 94.00 93.82 92.51 93.18 94.16 95.93 27.38
GRS test statistic 7.17
GRS (p-value) 0.00
Panel C: Reversal portfolios–four-factor model with PEAD portfolios
MKT 0.98 0.93 0.92 0.89 0.88 0.90 0.90 0.93 0.98 1.08 0.11
SMB 0.92 0.72 0.63 0.53 0.46 0.43 0.40 0.42 0.46 0.57 -0.35
HML 0.30 0.37 0.41 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.39 0.34 0.28 0.07 -0.23
PMN -0.28 -0.15 -0.11 -0.07 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.08 -0.25 0.03
INTERCEPT 0.87 0.54 0.42 0.26 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.11 0.31 -0.99
t (MKT) 30.38 35.41 46.46 43.75 41.14 38.31 40.67 42.47 43.82 47.30 3.56
t (SMB) 11.83 9.81 9.81 8.75 6.89 5.87 5.54 5.92 5.94 6.52 -6.50
t (HML) 4.19 6.91 9.04 9.43 8.72 7.91 6.62 5.80 4.58 1.07 -3.57
t (PMN) -2.50 -1.79 -1.77 -1.55 -0.28 -0.54 -0.36 -1.11 -1.92 -3.81 0.31
t (INTERCEPT) 3.95 3.14 3.36 2.65 2.18 1.73 1.46 1.52 1.01 2.15 -5.37
F-test 739.10 1131.93 1463.25 1514.11 1300.02 1244.71 1051.47 1114.12 1238.38 1401.84 36.08
Prob(F-test) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adj − R2(%) 88.84 92.42 94.04 94.22 93.34 93.06 91.89 92.31 93.03 93.79 27.44
GRS test statistic 6.36
GRS (p-value) 0.00
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Table 11: Results from time series regressions. Panels A and B give the results for set 3 regression models. The 10-decile portfolios
and a zero investment portfolio (WMLr) work as dependent and the three risk factors from Fama-French and four lags for PEAD
(equation 4.8) and Momentum (equation 4.7) based zero-investment portfolio annual returns as independent variables. The Gibbons
et al. (1989) test statistic and the associated p-values are also being presented. January 1975 to December 2010. NYSE-AMEX ﬁrms.
Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High W MLr
Panel A: Reversal portfolios - PEAD annual returns
MKT 1.08 1.02 1.00 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.99 1.04 1.14 0.06
SMB 0.78 0.59 0.45 0.37 0.31 0.26 0.21 0.26 0.30 0.41 -0.37
HML 0.62 0.57 0.60 0.56 0.55 0.51 0.46 0.46 0.40 0.32 -0.30
PMN(0) -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
PMN(-1) 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03
PMN(-2) -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
PMN(-3) 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
PMN(-4) 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02
INTERCEPT -0.00 0.35 0.22 0.13 0.05 0.00 0.27 0.19 0.44 0.34 0.23
t (MKT) 29.91 32.76 37.76 36.63 37.07 35.13 37.82 39.32 41.76 41.33 2.06
t (SMB) 6.15 5.96 4.89 4.45 3.75 3.14 2.67 3.03 3.52 4.40 -5.84
t (HML) 6.72 8.26 8.82 8.64 8.30 7.46 7.18 6.70 5.81 4.36 -5.21
t(PMN(0)) -0.68 -0.18 -0.82 0.49 0.40 0.84 0.82 0.28 -0.12 -0.05 0.32
t(PMN(-1)) 1.23 0.45 0.38 -0.08 0.47 0.54 -0.26 -0.11 -0.74 -0.69 -2.75
t(PMN(-2)) -0.92 -1.49 -1.66 -1.14 -0.79 -0.58 -0.91 -1.04 -1.23 -0.89 0.30
t(PMN(-3)) 0.58 -0.92 -0.28 0.04 -0.29 -0.36 -0.51 -0.75 -1.31 -0.59 -1.75
t(PMN(-4)) 0.19 0.86 1.64 0.41 0.63 0.54 -0.44 0.70 0.11 -1.08 -1.54
t (INTERCEPT) -0.01 0.70 0.56 0.35 0.13 0.01 0.71 0.45 1.02 0.80 0.47
F-test 247.25 382.25 403.48 413.42 412.16 382.69 389.06 360.22 393.56 388.10 18.62
Prob(F-test) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adj − R2(%) 85.36 90.02 90.50 90.71 90.68 90.03 90.18 89.48 90.28 90.16 29.43
GRS test statistic 1.139
GRS (p-value) 0.332
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Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High W MLr
Panel B: Reversal portfolios - Momentum annual returns
MKT 1.08 1.01 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.96 1.00 1.05 1.15 0.07
SMB 0.76 0.58 0.44 0.36 0.31 0.25 0.22 0.25 0.31 0.41 -0.35
HML 0.57 0.54 0.57 0.53 0.53 0.47 0.43 0.41 0.36 0.28 -0.31
W ML
m(0) -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.01
W ML
m(-1) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
W ML
m(-2) -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
W ML
m(-3) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
W ML
m(-4) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
INTERCEPT 0.43 0.20 0.23 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.09 -0.05 -0.05 -0.80
t (MKT) 33.08 36.95 42.53 40.90 40.79 38.78 40.65 42.42 43.80 43.16 2.55
t (SMB) 6.18 5.89 4.84 4.35 3.66 3.00 2.61 2.89 3.46 4.31 -5.97
t (HML) 6.92 8.76 9.38 8.84 8.32 7.26 6.50 5.87 5.24 3.61 -5.45
t(W MLm(0)) -2.95 -2.74 -2.57 -1.05 -0.65 -0.57 0.49 -0.24 -0.38 -0.86 1.69
t(W MLm(-1)) -0.80 -1.11 -1.34 -1.09 -0.77 -0.31 -1.16 -1.01 -1.10 -0.79 -0.71
t(W MLm(-2)) -0.66 -0.17 -0.41 0.41 0.50 1.10 0.75 0.44 0.72 0.35 0.83
t(W MLm(-3)) 0.15 0.31 0.45 1.51 1.73 1.55 1.23 0.44 0.56 0.37 0.32
t(W MLm(-4)) 0.22 0.81 0.52 0.30 0.02 -0.65 -0.98 -0.92 -0.54 -0.88 -0.85
t (INTERCEPT) 1.91 1.10 1.49 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 0.22 0.45 -0.25 -0.24 -3.35
F-test 274.92 417.17 448.44 453.77 431.79 405.24 387.52 361.66 397.93 397.79 19.78
Prob(F-test) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adj − R2(%) 85.69 90.10 90.72 90.82 90.40 89.83 89.42 88.74 89.67 89.66 29.10
GRS test statistic 1.02
GRS (p-value) 0.424
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Table 12: Results from time series regressions. Panels A and B give the results for set 3 regression models. The 10-decile portfolios
and a zero investment portfolio (WMLr) work as dependent and the three risk factors from Fama-French and four lags for PEAD (4.8)
and Momentum (4.7) based zero-investment portfolio annual returns as independent variables. The Gibbons et al. (1989) test statistic
and the associated p-values are also being presented. January 1975 to December 2010. NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ ﬁrms.
Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High W MLr
Panel A: Reversal portfolios - PEAD annual returns
MKT 0.99 0.95 0.93 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.92 0.98 1.09 0.10
SMB 0.98 0.76 0.66 0.54 0.46 0.43 0.40 0.43 0.47 0.60 -0.37
HML 0.34 0.41 0.43 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.42 0.37 0.32 0.12 -0.23
PMN(0) -0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00
PMN(-1) 0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03
PMN(-2) -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
PMN(-3) -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
PMN(-4) -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
INTERCEPT 0.41 0.62 0.51 0.53 0.38 0.35 0.30 0.36 0.74 0.98 0.38
t (MKT) 38.28 43.63 52.93 45.38 41.37 39.45 42.74 46.03 46.12 42.11 3.16
t (SMB) 11.45 9.77 9.54 8.66 6.86 5.80 5.63 6.03 6.08 6.98 -6.24
t (HML) 4.62 7.26 8.97 9.88 9.18 8.77 8.01 7.10 5.87 1.96 -3.47
t(PMN(0)) -0.65 0.27 -0.20 0.11 0.82 0.96 1.16 1.13 0.56 -0.57 0.14
t(PMN(-1)) 1.40 0.55 0.02 -0.26 0.22 0.29 0.01 -0.08 -0.60 -0.50 -2.25
t(PMN(-2)) -0.38 -1.60 -1.43 -1.53 -1.70 -1.51 -1.31 -1.60 -1.88 -1.04 -0.37
t(PMN(-3)) -0.24 -0.65 -0.66 -0.47 -0.66 -0.60 -0.69 -0.86 -1.55 -1.79 -1.47
t(PMN(-4)) -0.27 -0.46 0.52 -0.37 -0.28 -0.60 -0.57 -0.48 -1.24 -1.50 -1.35
t (INTERCEPT) 0.45 0.98 0.99 1.11 0.77 0.70 0.62 0.71 1.37 1.53 0.51
F-test 293.97 466.13 615.49 655.24 597.45 557.08 512.47 516.14 565.59 540.99 17.63
Prob(F-test) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adj − R2(%) 87.40 91.67 93.57 93.93 93.38 92.94 92.37 92.42 93.04 92.74 28.24
GRS test statistic 0.921
GRS (p-value) 0.514
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Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High W MLr
Panel B: Reversal portfolios - Momentum annual returns
MKT 0.99 0.94 0.92 0.89 0.88 0.90 0.90 0.92 0.98 1.09 0.10
SMB 0.97 0.75 0.65 0.54 0.46 0.43 0.40 0.43 0.47 0.61 -0.36
HML 0.32 0.38 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.38 0.34 0.29 0.09 -0.24
W ML
m(0) -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.00
W ML
m(-1) 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01
W ML
m(-2) -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
W ML
m(-3) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
W ML
m(-4) 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
INTERCEPT 0.46 0.31 0.22 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.09 -0.00 0.14 -0.65
t (MKT) 37.57 43.36 54.30 47.95 42.33 41.37 44.29 48.16 48.77 46.36 3.46
t (SMB) 12.71 10.30 10.17 8.71 6.61 5.57 5.21 5.67 5.88 7.22 -6.10
t (HML) 4.48 7.57 9.68 10.21 9.11 8.40 6.98 6.25 4.97 1.48 -3.50
t(W MLm(0)) -2.15 -2.13 -2.13 -1.08 -0.82 -0.54 0.07 -0.06 -0.53 -2.09 0.04
t(W MLm(-1)) 1.18 0.86 0.85 -0.07 0.37 0.42 -0.59 0.21 0.13 0.70 -1.62
t(W MLm(-2)) -0.14 0.25 0.55 1.45 1.87 2.35 1.19 1.17 0.85 0.22 0.22
t(W MLm(-3)) 0.63 0.41 0.90 1.34 1.98 2.08 1.13 0.62 0.74 -0.37 -0.64
t(W MLm(-4)) 1.21 1.26 0.82 0.36 -0.86 -1.34 -0.72 -1.24 -0.92 -1.68 -2.14
t (INTERCEPT) 2.37 2.27 2.19 0.99 0.97 0.40 0.70 0.67 -0.02 1.03 -3.56
F-test 328.15 528.21 691.88 721.77 630.13 590.62 496.32 521.69 571.84 590.46 19.11
Prob(F-test) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adj − R2(%) 87.73 92.02 93.79 94.03 93.22 92.80 91.54 91.92 92.58 92.80 28.36
GRS test statistic 1.60
GRS (p-value) 0.105
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